Three Federal Agencies Already Do What FMCSA Won't

The federal government already knows how to protect consumers in regulated transportation and commodity industries. It does it for airline passengers. It does it for produce growers. It does it for livestock sellers. In each case, Congress created a dedicated enforcement office with real authority: the power to investigate, adjudicate, fine, suspend, and publish results.

For interstate household goods shippers, Congress gave the job to the Secretary of Transportation in the ICC Termination Act of 1995. The Secretary delegated it to the highway safety agency, which became FMCSA. FMCSA told GAO it does not want it. Nothing in statute requires HHG consumer protection to remain at FMCSA. The Secretary could move it to a separate office within OST tomorrow, just as DOT did for aviation. Three existing federal programs show what competent enforcement looks like, and what 400,000 annual moving consumers are missing.

DOT's Office of Aviation Consumer Protection sits within the Office of the Secretary, not within the FAA. This separation was deliberate. When DOT considered placing aviation consumer protection at the FAA, officials realized consumer protection would be lost in the FAA's safety mission. So they created a separate office.

OACP enforces 49 U.S.C. 41712, which prohibits unfair and deceptive practices in air transportation. Its enforcement authority in competition matters exceeds that of the Department of Justice in some respects.

What OACP does that FMCSA does not:

- Investigates carriers and issues consent orders with real penalties. In 2023 alone, DOT assessed over $50 million in civil penalties against airlines for consumer protection violations. - Publishes complaint data transparently. Consumers can see complaint narratives, airline responses, and outcomes without filing FOIA requests. - Responds to congressional inquiries about specific carriers with substantive information, not form letters. - Issues rulemaking that adapts to emerging consumer harms (automatic refund rules, fee disclosure requirements, tarmac delay protections).

The aviation model works because the office has one mission: consumer protection. It does not compete with a safety budget. It does not report to leadership whose performance is measured by crash statistics. It exists to protect passengers, and its staff, budget, and culture reflect that.

FMCSA's household goods program is the FAA scenario DOT deliberately avoided. Consumer protection buried inside a safety agency, competing for resources it will never win.

The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 (PACA) protects produce growers and sellers from unfair dealing by buyers, brokers, and commission merchants. USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) administers PACA through a dedicated division.

PACA created something that does not exist in household goods enforcement: a binding federal adjudication process for individual disputes.

How PACA reparations work:

- A grower or seller who was cheated files a complaint with USDA. Filing fee: $100. - USDA investigates. If informal resolution fails, the case goes to a PACA examiner who issues a reparation order. - Reparation orders are published. They create precedent. Industry participants can read them and understand what conduct violates the Act. - If the respondent does not pay the reparation order, the complainant can file it in federal district court and enforce it as a judgment. - Repeat violators lose their PACA license. Without a PACA license, a dealer cannot legally buy or sell produce in interstate commerce. The business stops.

PACA handles roughly 2,500 formal complaints per year. Reparation decisions are publicly available. The system creates accountability through transparency: every dealer knows that cheating a grower can result in a published decision, a payment order, and ultimately the loss of their license.

Now compare this to 49 U.S.C. 14704, the household goods equivalent. Section 14704 gives consumers the right to sue carriers and brokers in federal court for violations of the statute. But there is no administrative reparation process. No FMCSA examiner reviews the dispute. No binding order is issued. No decision is published. The consumer must hire a lawyer, file in federal court, and litigate against a company that may have dissolved by the time the case is heard.

PACA solved this problem in 1930. Congress gave USDA the authority to adjudicate disputes quickly, cheaply, and with real consequences.

Congress actually provided similar tools for household goods. Section 14704 contains an administrative complaint and adjudication mechanism for HHG disputes. It exists in the statute. FMCSA has never implemented it. Section 13702 contains rate and price regulatory provisions that could give consumers and regulators a framework for evaluating whether charges are lawful. FMCSA does not disclose this to consumers or the public.

PACA also has a tool that would transform HHG enforcement if it existed: the 'responsibly connected' person doctrine. Under PACA, the principals of a company that violates economic regulations can be personally barred from any participation in the produce industry for a period of time. The bar follows the person, not the company. If a dealer cheats growers, loses their PACA license, and tries to register a new company, the 'responsibly connected' designation prevents it. The principals are barred regardless of what new entity name they use.

Federal courts have upheld this authority. In Kleiman and Hochberg v. US Dept. of Agriculture (497 F.3d 681, DC Circuit 2007) and Perfectly Fresh Farms v. Dept. of Agriculture (692 F.3d 960, 9th Circuit 2012), courts confirmed USDA's authority to bar individuals connected to violating entities from the industry.

If HHG enforcement had a 'responsibly connected' provision, the chameleon carrier problem would be structurally solved. Moran Eli Hasut could not register JCS Moving and Storage five days before Handle With Care's revocation, because Hasut himself would be barred. Joseph Menard could not operate Bridgeview Van Lines simultaneously with Menards Moving, because Menard would be personally accountable. The bar follows the person. The company name is irrelevant.

The difference between PACA and HHG is not that Congress failed to provide the tools. It is that USDA built the administrative machinery to use them, and FMCSA did not. A $100 filing with a federal examiner is accessible. A federal lawsuit is not. The statute authorizes the first option. The agency offers only the second.

The Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 regulates the buying and selling of livestock, poultry, and meat. USDA enforces it through the Packers and Stockyards Division (now part of the Agricultural Marketing Service's Fair Trade Practices Program).

The Act gives USDA authority that FMCSA does not have or does not use:

- Administrative suspension and cease-and-desist orders. USDA can suspend a packer's or dealer's registration for violations without going to court first. The agency acts, and the respondent can appeal. Compare this to FMCSA, which must refer cases to DOT's Office of the Chief Counsel for prosecution, a process so slow that companies dissolve and reincorporate before enforcement reaches them. - Trust provisions (7 U.S.C. 196). Livestock sellers have a statutory trust on the buyer's assets until payment is received. If a packer goes bankrupt, the livestock seller has priority over other creditors. Moving consumers have no comparable protection. When a broker collects a deposit and the carrier demands additional payment, the consumer has no trust claim on either entity's assets. - Published enforcement actions. USDA publishes consent decisions, administrative complaints, and enforcement outcomes. Industry participants can see who has been sanctioned and for what. FMCSA's enforcement actions against household goods carriers are effectively invisible unless discovered through FOIA.

The Packers and Stockyards model demonstrates something important: even in an industry with far fewer participants than household goods moving, Congress recognized that administrative enforcement (not just the right to sue) was necessary to prevent fraud and unfair dealing. The agency can act on its own authority, quickly, without waiting for a consumer to file a federal lawsuit.

If household goods enforcement followed any of these three models, the system would look fundamentally different.

Under the OACP model: A separate office within DOT, reporting to the Secretary, with sole responsibility for interstate moving consumer protection. Complaint data published with narratives and outcomes. Consent orders with penalties large enough to change behavior. Rulemaking authority to address emerging fraud patterns (deposit limits, binding estimate requirements, disclosure rules). No competition with FMCSA's safety budget.

Under the PACA model: An administrative reparation process for individual consumer disputes. A consumer who was overcharged, hostage-loaded, or given a fraudulent estimate files a complaint with a $100 fee. A federal examiner reviews the evidence and issues a binding reparation order. The order is published, creating precedent. Brokers and carriers that do not pay lose their operating authority. The 14704 right to sue in federal court remains available, but most disputes are resolved administratively without litigation.

Under the Packers and Stockyards model: FMCSA (or its successor) can suspend operating authority administratively for documented violations. No referral to the Chief Counsel's office. No months of internal review while the company continues operating. Documented hostage loads, systematic overcharges, or fraudulent estimates trigger investigation and potential suspension within weeks, not years. A statutory trust protects consumer deposits until services are rendered.

Any of these models would be an improvement. The current system offers none of them.

The three federal models above demonstrate what consumer protection looks like at the national level. California demonstrates it at the state level.

The California Bureau of Household Goods and Services (BHGS) publishes a maximum rate tariff (84 pages, updated annually). Licensed movers can charge less than the tariff rate but never more. The state has statutory authority to set minimum rates at a level 'sufficient to allow safe operation upon the highways of the state and accounts for the cost of trained drivers' (BPC 19253(c)). BHGS has not yet exercised this authority, but the tool exists in California law and has no federal equivalent. If exercised, it would structurally prevent the lowball-then-extort model that dominates interstate fraud.

BHGS requires a separate CAL-T license beyond FMCSA registration. It assigns investigators to consumer complaints. When a carrier used interstate paperwork on an intrastate California move to dodge state jurisdiction, BHGS caught it and opened an investigation. FMCSA would not have looked.

In Peterfai v. USA Logistics (S.D. Cal., 23-cv-1695, Sept. 2024), the complaint noted that none of the defendants held the required BHGS license. They were operating interstate moves originating in California without the state license the law requires. California's licensing gate would have flagged them. FMCSA's $300 registration did not.

The California model proves that effective HHG regulation is not a matter of inventing new tools. The tools exist at both the federal and state level. They are used for airlines, produce, livestock, and California intrastate moves. They are not used for interstate household goods. See: California Shows What HHG Regulation Looks Like When It Works.

The aviation, produce, and livestock industries all have well-organized trade associations that lobbied for and helped design their regulatory frameworks. Airlines, growers, and ranchers had political power and economic concentration that made action possible.

The household goods moving industry is fragmented. There are roughly 10,000 active interstate movers and several thousand brokers. The legitimate operators do not lobby effectively for stronger enforcement because enforcement costs them compliance effort. The fraudulent operators actively resist it. And consumers, who move interstate once or twice in a lifetime, do not form a durable political constituency.

Here is the part that should frustrate everyone: moving HHG consumer protection out of FMCSA does not require an act of Congress. The legal mechanism already exists, and it is simpler than most people assume.

49 U.S.C. 102 creates the Department of Transportation and the Secretary. Subsection (j) mandates an Office of Aviation Consumer Protection. No similar mandate exists for HHG consumer protection, which means the Secretary has more organizational discretion over HHG, not less.

49 U.S.C. 113 creates FMCSA and directs it to treat safety as its 'highest priority.' That is a Congressional mandate. HHG consumer protection will always lose to safety inside FMCSA because Congress told FMCSA to prioritize safety.

49 U.S.C. 322 authorizes the Secretary to delegate and un-delegate duties to any officer or employee of the Department.

49 CFR 1.21 reserves to the Secretary all powers not delegated, and provides that 'the Secretary may exercise powers and duties delegated or assigned to officials other than the Secretary.' The Secretary can take back any delegated authority at any time.

49 CFR 1.87(a)(8) is where FMCSA's current authority over sections 14701 through 14705 lives. This is a delegation, not a Congressional mandate. The Secretary made it. The Secretary can unmake it.

The practical steps: the Secretary publishes a Federal Register notice reserving 14704 authority back to the Office of the Secretary. OST begins receiving consumer complaints and referring them directly to DOT's Office of Hearings for adjudication, bypassing FMCSA entirely. No time-consuming rulemaking is required for the delegation change itself. Rules of procedure for adjudication would require notice-and-comment rulemaking, but the referral mechanism can begin immediately.

This is not hypothetical. In March 2025, a retired transportation attorney filed a 14704 complaint directly with the Secretary of Transportation against a household goods broker. The complaint was forwarded to FMCSA, which cited 49 U.S.C. 113(f)(1) as the basis for its jurisdiction. FMCSA then sat on the complaint for seven months before referring it to DOT's Office of Hearings in January 2026. The referral, signed by FMCSA's Acting Deputy Chief Counsel, stated that 'FMCSA has not investigated the allegations' and 'FMCSA is not a party to this case.' The broker never responded to FMCSA's letter. DOT's own regulations at 49 CFR 5.91 require enforcement staff to decide on pursuing an action within 30 days of completing an investigation. FMCSA took seven months to do nothing and pass it along.

The case demonstrates both that the administrative adjudication mechanism under 14704 exists, and that FMCSA treats it as someone else's problem. The Secretary could eliminate the middleman with one Federal Register notice.

The result: three industries with robust federal consumer protection, and one industry where the responsible agency told GAO on the record that even with more resources, it would spend them on safety rather than consumer protection. The fix does not require Congress. It requires one decision by the Secretary of Transportation.

The models exist. The statutory frameworks exist. The precedent for separating consumer protection from safety agencies exists. The legal authority to act exists. The delegation can be changed with a stroke of a pen. What does not exist is the will to use it.